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Article 1

Surprised by Science: The “Original
Errors” of Paradise Lost
MICHAEL SLATER

W

hat can it mean to be surprised by science in Paradise Lost? Some
scholars have been surprised to discover that Milton, a radical in so
many other respects, appears decidedly backward in his scientific
positions and commitments.1 Some have been intrigued by the close association
between Satan’s legion of fallen angels and a new industrial technology, not unlike
that which was sweeping through London in the seventeenth century.2 Still others
have been intrigued by the plurality of worlds Milton seems ready to entertain, at
least in theory.3 While all these topics represent worthy critical investments, none
adequately captures the sense of surprise this essay will investigate. To be surprised
by science in Paradise Lost, I will argue, entails something like what Stanley Fish so
famously described in 1967, a series of interactions between text and reader
carefully designed to enthrall us, to remind us of our own complicity in the
narrative presently unfolding.4 In the context of original sin, this surprise involves
being reminded, more or less gently, that we have fallen for Satan’s trap, that we
have been seduced—not unlike Eve in Book 9—by his dazzling rhetoric and
charm. In the context of science, this surprise involves being reminded that we
continue to repeat the same “original errors” as our first parents on earth.
Since Surprised by Sin first appeared, critics have mounted a variety of
responses to it. Some have taken issue with its method, some with its conclusions.5
But the text remains indispensable for Milton scholars today. As many as three
decades after its initial appearance, John Rumrich could still characterize its
argument as the dominant paradigm within which studies of Paradise Lost operate,
regardless of the various critical methods they ostensibly employ.6 In the context
of Milton’s approach to science in particular, Fish intervened in what was
becoming an increasingly common view—that Milton adopts a fundamentally
classical and medieval perspective. For Fish, Milton rejects certain elements of the
“new science” to be sure, but no more than he rejects medieval science, too. What
seems so problematic in Paradise Lost, according to Fish, is the very attempt to
attain knowledge about things deemed by God “too high” for mortal minds.
In the midst of efforts to recuperate Milton’s attitude toward early
modern science, critics have routinely challenged elements of Surprised by Sin,
whether directly or indirectly. Whereas for Fish Satan functions in Paradise Lost as
a clear and problematic embodiment of empiricist epistemologies, for Daniel Fried
he represents instead a “perverted” empiricism, to be contrasted with Milton’s
own allegiance to its “truer” form.7 Against Fish’s claim that Eve falls largely as a
product of her devotion to experience, Karen Edwards argues in Milton and the
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Natural World that her fall arises mostly because she fails to live up to the rigorous
empirical standards of Milton’s contemporaries like Robert Boyle.8 As with Fried’s
account of Satan, Eve represents for Edwards a corrupt empiricism Milton finally
discounts. And far from disavowing the revelations of the “new astronomy” as
Fish claims, Milton, according to Catherine Gimelli Martin, instead displays a clear
“preference for the elegant rationality of the Copernican side of the argument.”9
“In the cosmology of Paradise Lost,” Harinder Singh Marjara writes somewhat
more cautiously, “heliocentrism is present in the spirit if not in the letter.”10
Whether Milton was of Galileo’s party, and to what extent he knew it, continues
to present readers with an interpretive dilemma.
My focus here is concerned somewhat less with deciphering Milton’s
particular scientific investments than with how he deploys scientific arguments
and narrative structures throughout Paradise Lost. In the decades since Fish
transformed the critical landscape by realizing the unique rhetorical effect of
Milton’s text, scholars in the history of science have similarly underscored the
central importance of narrative technique for the development of a new empirical
program in the seventeenth century.11 This emphasis has two effects for how we
read the status of science in Paradise Lost. On the one hand, to be an “empiricist”
in the modern sense means more than valuing experience as the root of all
knowledge.12 As Peter Dear and other historians have noted, experience was just
as crucial to the deductive program of Aristotelian science. To distinguish between
an older paradigm and the “new science” of the seventeenth century, what matters
is how experience gets construed and the kinds of experiences that count. Too
frequently, discussions of Satan and empiricism fail to account for the different
role experience plays for the “old science” and the “new,” and consequently to
distinguish adequately between deductive and inductive programs. As I detail in
the final section, Milton’s Satan displays a commitment to a decisively modern
form of experience, one that fails him spectacularly. He does not, as critics have
claimed, pervert empiricism in Paradise Lost. Instead, empiricism perverts his faith
in God.
On the other hand, attention to the narrative forms of scientific argument
primes us to consider the shape of Milton’s examples with special care. This
consideration certainly involves the kind of argument Fish has already made,
noting the double rhetorical structure of enticement and reproach as it pertains
specifically to our desire for knowledge. But it also involves another element
somewhat less noticed in this context. Paradise Lost, I argue, overtly presents both
Adam and Satan as archetypes for the errors endemic to the dominant modes of
science in the seventeenth century—Adam as an archetype of the new astronomer,
Satan as the new empiricist more broadly. Despite all the emphasis on innovation
underlying the “new science” in its various forms (astronomy, empiricism,
mechanism, etc.), Milton implies there is nothing terribly new there at all. In what
amounts almost to an inversion of typological exegesis, Milton’s text works back
from the philosophy of his age, embodied by figures like Galileo and Bacon, to
find the root of its errors in the first examples of scientific thought.
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“Already by thy reasoning”: Adam and the Archetypal Error of
Astronomy
Heav’n is for thee too high
To know what passes there; be lowly wise:
Think only what concerns thee and thy being;
Dream not of other Worlds, what Creatures there
Live, in what state, condition, or degree,
Contented that thus far hath been reveal’d
Not of Earth only but of Highest Heav’n. (8.172-78)13
Dream not of other worlds, Raphael sternly instructs Adam. Couched amidst his
notoriously evasive discussion of cosmology, Raphael proffers a principle of
Socratic humility: to be lowly wise. He cautions Adam to recognize the limits of
his perspective, since heaven is “too high” for human comprehension. But even
as he abjures lofty speculations, Raphael persistently redirects Adam’s gaze upward
to the heavens, to the very “worlds” he hopes—ostensibly at least—to bar from
the imagination. Immediately upon warning that the “great Architect” did “wisely
to conceal, and not divulge / His secrets,” Raphael invites Adam to consider a
number of competing cosmological theories, from the “thwart obliquities” of the
Ptolemaic model to the “three different motions” of earth in the Copernican (8.7274, 133, 130). His initial dismissal of “heavenly conjecture” is thus followed, as
Annabel Patterson notes, by “a series of hypotheses that admit Adam into that
same conjectural discourse. Three times he encourages Adam to think what if. That
is to say, to engage in scientific hypothesis.”14 Dream not, he says, but do consider
this.
If Raphael’s cosmological lecture leaves Adam ultimately uncertain as to
the nature of the heavens, it has left critics equally perplexed about the place of
scientific investigation in Milton’s narrative. For an older generation of critics, this
lecture and others like it cemented Milton’s scientific “backwardness,” his refusal
to accept the (obviously true) propositions of the “new astronomy” instituted
theoretically by Copernicus and demonstrated factually by Galileo.15 Others,
however, have worked to recuperate Milton’s attitude toward science in Paradise
Lost, emphasizing against his alleged backwardness Milton’s considerable
knowledge of contemporary scientific issues and his generally progressive
response.16 That we continue to debate Milton’s scientific alliances seems to me
symptomatic of the puzzling inconsistencies scattered throughout Paradise Lost.
Raphael warns against cosmic speculations only to invite Adam to partake in them.
Galileo holds a place of unparalleled honor as the only contemporary directly
named in the text, and yet Milton apparently dismisses his telescopic observations
as “less assured” and “imagined” (5.262-63). And even if Raphael does in fact
subtly betray a preference for the heliocentric hypothesis in Book 8, Uriel, an angel
of “unsurpassed sight,” describes a cosmos definitively Aristotelian five books
earlier (3.694-735). How can readers, both early modern and modern, reconcile
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these discrepancies? Amid the many competing pictures and theories represented
in Paradise Lost, where does Milton’s allegiance lie?
My aim is partly to substitute a different question, not least because this
one by all appearances stubbornly resists any clear answer. I am less interested
here in how to resolve the apparent tension between Raphael’s advice and his
practice, or between his two cosmic schemes, than I am in the conflict itself, its
very presence in the narrative. Why does Raphael encourage, even as he forbids
and rebukes, Adam’s contemplation of the heavens? That rhetorical pattern by
this point is familiar to nearly all of Milton’s readers. As he does in other contexts,
Milton will consistently elaborate a scientific dispute only to remind us, as it were,
of its fruitlessness—or perhaps more accurately of its “fruit-fullness,” its origin in
and/or relation to an act gluttonous consumption. In Paradise Lost, the Ptolemaic
and Copernican depictions of heaven both suffer reproach, rivals more in their
vanity than in their accuracy. If, as Peter Herman notes, a persistent need to
reconcile what appear to be contradictions in the poem largely defines the history
of Milton criticism, in this particular case that need is precisely what is under
assault.17 Adam yearns to resolve the nature of the heavens, to determine which
of two competing possibilities more accurately reflects their reality. Raphael warns
in response that certainty and resolution, however desirable, lie inveterately
beyond Adam’s reach. His dialogue in Book 8, far from demonstrating any clear
preference for one position or the other, stages the history of astronomical debate
as a caricature of Adam’s fundamental errors in reasoning.
The specific content of that dialogue is less significant than its frame(s),
at least inasmuch as it might reveal how scientific reasoning gets deployed in
Paradise Lost. Raphael’s brief sketch of the two dominant and as yet undecided
cosmic models sits conspicuously amongst not one, nor even two or three, but
four rebukes, with Adam contributing a fifth himself.18 Just as Milton often warns
readers both before and after Satan speaks of the arch-tempter’s hypocrisy,
Raphael warns Adam doubly (or quadruply) of the dangers lurking in astronomical
science. We do well to remember that the explicit purpose of the angel’s visit is to
“admonish”—in the double sense of to caution and to reprimand—Adam and Eve
about the dangers of temptation and transgression. Altogether Raphael divides
roughly sixty-eight lines between the different scientific models he describes, with
another sixty-one lines devoted to admonitions.19 The dialogue in Book 8 thus
places at least as much weight on the latter as the former. When we consider that
it discourages astronomical speculation at nearly twice the length it devotes to any
single paradigm, that weight appears to shift a good deal more.
We have been disinclined as modern readers to believe that Raphael
carefully designs his disputation, as he claims, only to quell Adam’s speculations,
rather than to urge any particular position.20 But given the evidence, this may have
more to do with our own scientific investments than with his. We tend to marshal
Raphael’s dialogue either to fault Milton for his failure to accept the new
Copernican science or to praise him for embracing it. From the perspective of
Paradise Lost, however, our desire to judge Milton’s account of the heavens against
reality is itself a condition of the fall inherited from Adam. Our desire reflects his.
We presume to know the nature of the heavens, just as Adam had presumed. By
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our need to resolve a question left painfully open in the text, we commit the same
“crime” that is the primary source of Raphael’s dialogue, at least for Milton: we
reach “too high.”
Adam’s astronomical conjectures at this point in Book 8 are not yet a
product of fallen knowledge, to be sure. They are, nonetheless, bound up in the
temptation to fall. Eve’s violation of God’s law will eventually transpire because
of her ambition to acquire knowledge deemed too high—a height that Satan, at
least, figures explicitly in terms of astronomy. Characterizing his alleged
transformation upon eating the fruit, the serpent claims that
Thenceforth to speculations high or deep
I turned my thoughts, and with capacious mind
Considered all things visible in heaven,
Or earth, or middle, all things fair and good. (9.602-05; emphasis
mine)
When the serpent later promises the fruit will allow Eve “not only to discern /
Things in their causes, but to trace the ways / Of highest agents,” the knowledge
he evokes is astronomical: to traces the ways, or motions, of “things visible in
heaven” (9.681-83). The fall, despite Eve’s transgression in this specific historical
moment, is only the fulfillment of an ambition already latent in Adam’s
“speculations high.” Her desire to ingest the fruit’s “sciential sap” serves as the
final realization of Adam’s “thirst for knowledge,” a thirst he describes explicitly in
the midst of his conversation with Raphael (8.8). If Adam does not share in Eve’s
culpability for that first bite, he at the very least shares in her desire. And so too
do we, according to Milton.
That we share in this desire is one of the overarching implications of
Paradise Lost, the demonstration of which is also one of its principal rhetorical
effects. Raphael condemns the future dispute between cosmological paradigms as
the height of vanity, a struggle to know the nature of the heavens as fruitless as it
is proud (8.75-79). Perhaps most significantly, he positions that dispute as the
logical result of Adam’s original mistake, as if Galileo’s new astronomy is only the
latest in a long string of errors that reverberates through history. Raphael explicitly
depicts Adam as a type for Galileo and other seventeenth-century innovators, who
continue to repeat the original errors of the former by an even more pronounced
presumption of knowledge, a presumption made especially possible by the
telescope. “Already by thy reasoning this I guess,” Raphael reproaches Adam (8.8586; emphasis mine). What the angel guesses so prophetically, with the benefit of
Milton’s hindsight, implicates both the Ptolemaic and the Copernican
astronomers:
how they will wield
The mighty frame, how build, unbuild, contrive
To save appearances, how gird the sphere
With centric and eccentric scribbled o’er
Cycle and epicycle, orb in orb:
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Already by thy reasoning this I guess,
Who art to lead thy offspring, and suppos’st
That bodies bright and greater should not serve
The less not bright, nor heaven such journeys run,
Earth sitting still, when she alone receives
The benefit… (8.80-90)
Raphael’s condemnation exhibits a carefully crafted symmetry, attributing blame
equally to both propositions. While beginning with a caricature of the Ptolemaic
model, “With centric and eccentric scribbled o’er / Cycle and epicycle,” it shifts
suddenly and unexpectedly—i.e., surprisingly—to a curt dismissal of the
Copernican. Upon our first reading, we assume that Raphael marks the Ptolemaic
scheme as the epitome of Adam’s fallacious reasoning in Eden, and rightly so. The
colon that follows his description of that scheme in line 84 (“orb in orb:”) leads
us to associate the two thoughts, as though this in line 85 has for its antecedent
everything that preceded it in lines 80 to 84. That’s how colons work. But as
Raphael continues, a shift in systems jars our reading experience. Adam’s fallacious
reasoning actually supposes, we learn, “That bodies bright and greater [i.e., the
sun] should not serve / The less not bright [i.e., earth], nor heaven such journeys
run, / Earth sitting still.” This is a central assumption driving the Copernican
philosophers—that the earth itself might move with far more simplicity than the
heavens. The point is not that Raphael predominately faults this latter scheme, but
that he faults both. The dispute itself, Raphael surmises, will serve only to provoke
God’s laughter at their “quaint opinions wide” (8.78).
Between the third and fourth rebukes in Raphael’s dialogue, from lines
122 to 166, we find perhaps the most detailed description of the current state of
astronomy in Milton’s narrative. It includes allusions to Gilbert and Kepler, to
Copernicus and Galileo, and to profoundly new concepts like “earthshine.” The
angel begins by evoking Kepler, particularly his conception of the sun’s “attractive
virtue,” which had relied heavily upon Gilbert’s work on the lodestone. “What if
the sun be centre to the world,” Raphael asks, “and other stars / By his attractive
virtue … dance about him various rounds?” (8.122-25). In his Astronomia Nova
(1609) and in the second edition to his Mysterium Cosmographicum (1621), Kepler
aimed to demonstrate a causal relation between the sun’s rotation and the
planetary orbits, which he eventually located in the sun’s “virtue.”21 As he continues
to expound this heliocentric hypothesis, Raphael accumulates additional
developments from the new astronomy, both theoretical and observational: he
refers to the earth’s “three different motions” (8.129-30), a central tenet in
Copernicus; to the “terrestrial moon” famously observed by Galileo’s “glazed
optic tube” (8.142); and to Galileo’s argument that earth, like all planets, reflects
light from the sun (8.140-44).
Galileo considered this last point an important contribution for denying
any essential difference between the terrestrial and the celestial bodies. The latter
did not shine by their own internal light, he argued, but by reflecting light from
the sun. If the earth similarly reflected light, we have no reason to assume it to be
any different in nature from the moon or other planets. He claimed to observe the
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effects of this reflection in the moon, as he explains in The Dialogue Concerning the
Two Chief World Systems (1632):
just as the moon supplies us with the light we lack from the sun a
great part of the time, and by reflection of its rays makes the nights
fairly bright, so the earth repays it by reflecting the solar rays when
the moon most needs them, giving a very strong illumination—as
much greater than what the moon gives us … as the surface of the
earth is greater than that of the moon.22
In his dialogue in Paradise Lost, Raphael explicitly contemplates the broader
implications of this future and highly specific claim. The Ptolemaic model, he
urges,
needs not thy belief,
If Earth industrious of herself fetch Day
Travelling East, and with her part averse
From the Sun’s beam meet Night, her other part
Still luminous by his ray. What if that light
Sent from her through the wide transpicuous air,
To the terrestrial Moon be as a Star
Enlightening her by Day, as she by Night
This Earth? (8.136-44; emphasis mine)
The syntax is a bit murky, but the implication is clear. Raphael consistently uses
the masculine pronoun throughout his discussion to refer to the sun, and the
feminine to refer to the earth and moon. What if the light sent from her (the earth)
to the “terrestrial moon” is like that of a star, shining for her (the moon) by day in
the same way that she (the moon) reflects light to earth by evening? When Raphael
claims to anticipate the whole history of astronomy in Adam’s high speculations,
Milton ensures that he gets it right, up to and including these recent developments
by Galileo and his peers.
Even as the “new astronomy” certainly dominates this discussion in
Raphael’s dialogue, it suffers from the rebukes that frame it no more or less than
the old astronomy. “Whether thus these things, or whether not,” Raphael
concludes his discussion,
Whether the sun predominant in heaven
Rise on earth, or earth rise on the sun,
He from the east his flaming road begin,
Or she from west her silent course advance
…
Solicit not thy thoughts with matters hid,
Leave them to God above…
…heaven is for thee too high
To know what passes there. (8.159-73; emphasis mine)
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If the new astronomy receives the bulk of Raphael’s attention, this final
summation serves neither as a subtle endorsement nor as a more thorough
censure, as his final summation is careful to note. Such “discoveries” as these
merely represent the pinnacle of astronomical “achievement” in Milton’s age, and
so stand as the final—but by no means best or worst—instantiations of Adam’s
error.
The rhetorical pattern established by Raphael’s dialogue, wherein an
auditor (or reader) is simultaneously encouraged and rebuked for his cosmic
speculations, occurs frequently in Paradise Lost. Nearly all of the overt references
to Galileo contain some deep-seated ambiguity, which helps to explain the critical
controversy surrounding his presence in the text.23 One of these, in Book 3,
famously provides Fish with a classic example of rhetorical surprise. For him, the
Galileo similes function as “a preparation for the moment in Book VIII when
Adam responds to Raphael’s astronomical dissertation: ‘To whom thus Adam
clear’d of doubt.’”24 We are surprised by that summation, since the dialogue seems
to have raised more questions than it has answered. But we are also prepared for
that response, Fish argues: “He is cleared of doubt, not because he now knows
how the universe is constructed, but because he knows that he cannot know.”25
What links this moment to so many others in the text is not just rhetorical surprise,
but an unyielding indecision—an inability, Milton insists, to finally decide in
matters of science. Despite our best efforts, speculation cannot aspire to
knowledge. For Milton, the most recent “advances” in astronomical science, as I
hope to have shown, serve only as echoes of Adam’s “quaint opinions wide”
(8.78). And if Adam provides a type for all subsequent astronomers, their errors
only a repetition of his, the scientific dilemma he faces also models an overarching
problem endemic to empirical investigation. Astronomy is only one embodiment
of a broader speciousness in the text, one that incorporates not only Adam and
Galileo but Satan as well.

The Arch-tempter, Satan: An Archetypal Experiment
Satan is certainly a perplexing figure in Paradise Lost, a mouthpiece for ideas and
attitudes shared by many of Milton’s contemporaries—indeed, according to some,
by Milton himself. Among other things, he has been linked to revolutionary
politics and radical egalitarianism, to an emergent mechanism or industrialism, to
seventeenth-century philosophers like Hobbes and Descartes, and, more
generally, to the new empirical reliance on experimentation.26 Satan’s associations
with Galileo have also been well documented, if not entirely resolved.27 The main
question in such cases is whether Satan perverts or exemplifies these associations,
and as a corollary whether the text valorizes or condemns the attitudes involved.
Despite the moral judgment we expect to find implicitly attached to Satan, these
issues admit no easy answers.
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My concern here is principally with experimentation, both its specific
relation to the “tempter,” one of Satan’s most common epithets, and its general
standing for Milton. The systematic program of experimentation we now
inevitably associate with modern science, whereby an investigator forms a
hypothesis, conducts an experiment (or series of experiments), and draws
appropriate conclusions, was still under development in the latter part of the
seventeenth century.28 As a mode of investigation, experimentalism received some
form of official sanction only a decade or so before Milton published his text, with
the arrival of the Royal Society in 1660. But even the institutionalization of
experimental science was no sure sign of its success, as Steven Shapin and Simon
Schaffer have persuasively shown. Not all of the new scientists—much less the
“old” ones—were convinced about the virtues of experimentation. Hobbes, in
particular, delivered a series of trenchant critiques throughout the 1660s and 1670s
regarding the assumptions and methods of “the Greshamites,” as he referred to
members of the Royal Society.29 It is in the midst of this contest over scientific
legitimacy, by no means settled, that Paradise Lost emerges, and with it Milton’s
portrayal of the grand experimenter Satan.
There can be little doubt that Milton makes of Satan an advocate for
experiential knowledge. “By proof to try” becomes something of a motto for the
fallen angels, and certainly Satan urges the value of experience to manipulate Eve
in Book 9. With the exception of Milton’s poetic invocation, the very first thing a
reader encounters in Paradise Lost is a conversation between Satan and Beelzebub
about their failed “experiment” in heaven. “[S]o much the stronger proved / He
with his thunder,” Satan claims, “and till then who knew / The force of those dire
arms” (1.92-94). As the conclusion of lines 92 and 93 underscores, Satan posits an
essential bond between proof and knowledge. To really know the force of God’s
might, one must test it, just as he will advise before the battle in Book 5. Even
Satan’s name may have suggested for Milton his connection to experimentation.
For many of the new philosophers, the highest model of investigation was a kind
of experiment Bacon had labeled “lucifera,” those that have no purpose but to
discover causes and axioms.30 Among members of the Royal Society, “luciferous”
thus became a common adjective to describe their experiments.31 And although
Milton rarely uses the name “Lucifer,” he does so for the first time, significantly,
just as Satan formulates his experimental designs in heaven, his plot “by proof to
try / Who is our equal” (5.865-66).32
While the associations between “Lucifer” and experimentation may
appear somewhat tenuous, Milton reinforces Satan’s experimentalism with
another name he routinely provides as an epithet, the “tempter.” To “tempt” can
carry a host of meanings in the seventeenth century, as Daniel Fried notes.
“Temptation is to put to the test,” he writes, “to try, to attempt (a cognate Milton
often puts in close proximity to tempt and Tempter). It can mean, following the Latin
root temptare, ‘to attack.’ It can even carry the force of ‘to experiment.’”33 In the
earliest events of Paradise Lost, Satan has conflated all of these meanings in a single
grand experiment: with his attack in heaven, he tempts his fellow angels to test the
might (and ultimately the wrath) of God. He forms a clear hypothesis—that God
has not created the angels and has no real power over them—and sets about to
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test it, to prove by experimental war whether the angels shall approach the throne
of God “beseeching or besieging” (5.869). Having failed, he even projects his own
temptation onto God, who, Satan claims, by concealing his strength “tempted our
attempt, and wrought our fall” (1.642). For an experimentalist like Lucifer,
“temptation” is a modus operandi.
Satan is not the only character in Paradise Lost to proffer the value of
experience, nor is it any experience he values. He advocates a particular kind of
experience, one that had only just gained prominence in the seventeenth century.34
In one of the most pivotal scenes of the text, the debate between Satan and Abdiel
before the war in heaven, Milton illustrates two profoundly different notions of
experience. If Satan’s name and epithet both suggest for readers his relation to
experimentation, Abdiel’s signifies instead his unyielding faith in God. “Abdiel”
literally means “servant of God,” a duty he demonstrates in Milton’s text against
overwhelming opposition. He only is “faithful found, / Among the faithless,
faithful only he … unmoved / Unshaken, unseduced, unterrified” (5.896-99). We
might be tempted, given the degree to which Milton marks it, to regard Abdiel’s
“unshaken faith” as the epistemic counterpart to an insistence on experience.
Satan’s skeptical argument that none can truly know God’s role as the creator since
none has experience of creation (“who saw when this creation was?”) has no effect
on Abdiel, but we would be mistaken to assume, as Satan does, that his faith is
therefore blind. Faith in God is axiomatic for Abdiel, a first principle from which
all subsequent reasoning proceeds. But even so, it is grounded in experience.
Against Satan’s heresies, Abdiel counters that
Yet by experience taught we know how good,
And of our good, and of our dignity
How provident he is, how far from thought
To make us less, bent rather to exalt
Our happy state under one head more near
United. (5.826-31; emphasis mine)
From Abdiel’s unique perspective, the angels have had countless experiences to
indicate the benevolence and omnipotence of God. It is simply not the kind of
experience that satisfies Satan.
What Satan demands instead is “experimental” proof, the experience of a
singularly contrived event that has been designed specifically to test his hypothesis.
What separates modern empiricism from the deductive science of Aristotelian
philosophers, as Peter Dear explains, is this different sense of how experience
informs knowledge, not the fact that it does so. For a deductive science like
Aristotle’s, philosophers require universal statements that can function as
premises. Since these cannot be derived intuitively, “they must be rendered
acceptable through appeal to experience,” as Dear notes.35 In his Opticorum libri sex
(1613), Franciscus Anguilonius describes how experience can furnish such
premises:
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A single sensory act does not greatly aid in the establishment of
sciences and the settlement of common notions, since error can
exist which lies hidden for a single act; but having been repeated
time and again, [the act] strengthens the judgment of truth until
[that judgment] finally passes into common assent; whence
afterwards they [i.e., the “common notions”] are put together,
through reasoning, as with the first principles of a science.”36
To a deductive scientist, experience is “what happens” in the everyday and the
routine, a product of countless testimonies (of the memory and of others) that
ultimately furnish an indisputably factual premise. A modern “experiment,” on the
other hand, is “what happened” at a particular time and place, a singular
spatiotemporal event that can be reported and construed so as to produce a
knowledge claim.37 Herein lies the fundamental dissimilarity between Abdiel’s and
Satan’s respective appeals to “experience.” For the former, the collective
experiences of the host of angels confirm the nature of God; for the latter, a single
test artfully designed will suffice.
Since Fish first argued that Milton, by “making Satan an empiricist,”
warned his readers against intellectual pride, critics have endeavored to recuperate
the role of empirical science in Paradise Lost, just as they have also endeavored to
recuperate Milton’s attitude toward science more broadly.38 By tracing in the
Columbia Milton “a set of almost entirely positive references to experience,”
Daniel Fried, for instance, makes of Milton an “implicit empiricist.”39 “Satan is the
clearest type of empiricist who appears in any of Milton’s poetry,” he admits, but
a “perverted empiricist, constantly experimenting through violence to determine
the limits of divine sovereignty, and constantly refusing to acknowledge the
resulting proofs that there are no such limits.”40 John Rogers similarly refers to
Satan’s “vulgar empiricism,” even as he traces—in the best account to date—the
rigorous logic underwriting Satan’s argument to be “self-raised, self-begot,” along
with its possibly empirical basis.41 But “by representing Satan as lying about the
fruit,” as Karen Edwards urges, “Milton shows that Satan has abused the potential
of the new experimental philosophy for instilling wisdom – not that it has no such
potential.”42
The critical dispute, to the extent that there is one, is not whether Satan
is an empiricist, but whether he is a good one. By beginning in media res, Milton
places front and center the disastrous consequences of what amounts to the first
experiment (and the first “temptation”) in history. We do not yet know in Book 1
how fully the angels conceive the war in heaven as a test of God’s might. We realize
primarily that despite his loss, Satan claims to find comfort in what has been
discovered in the process, “since through experience of this great event,” he cries,
the fallen angels are “in foresight much advanc’t” (1.118-19). They have not
achieved their ends to be sure, but they have not failed entirely either. Any
experiment, mistaken or not, produces knowledge; the angels understand God’s
nature better than they had, and thus “may with more successful hope resolve /
To wage by force or guile eternal War” (1.120-21). An unsuccessful test is only an
occasion for further testing in Satan’s reasoning. We might expect as much from
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any scientist worth his salt. By the time of Paradise Regained millennia later, Satan’s
optimism has waned, but his persistence has not. “So Satan, whom repulse upon
repulse / Met ever,” Milton relates, “gives not o’er though desperate of success, /
And his vain importunity pursues” (4.21-24). As an experimenter, Satan perfectly
encapsulates Edison’s doctrine that scientific achievement is “one percent
inspiration and ninety-nine percent perspiration.”43 And yet, his relentless
determination has been cited as the clearest evidence for his perversion of
empirical reasoning. As Fried writes, “Satan remains ‘by success untaught’: he has
absorbed none of the lessons.”44 In the place of genuine inquiry, he displays
instead willful ignorance.
To better grasp the stakes and implications of Satan’s experiment in
heaven, we must wait until Book 5. There we witness its formulation in much
greater detail. Only by considering more carefully its design can we finally judge
Satan’s relative success or failure and determine whether continued experiments,
however “vain” and “importunate,” are either a perversion or an exemplar of the
empirical method. When first encouraging disobedience, Satan counsels his fellow
angels to question received wisdom:
That we were form’d then say’st thou? and the work
Of secondary hands, by task transferr’d
From Father to his Son? strange point and new!
Doctrine which we would know whence learnt: who saw
When this creation was? remember’st thou
Thy making, while the Maker gave thee being?
We know no time when we were not as now;
Know none before us, self-begot, self-rais’d
By our own quick’ning power, when fatal course
Had circl’d his full Orb, the birth mature
Of this our native Heav’n, Ethereal Sons.
Our puissance is our own, our own right hand
Shall teach us highest deeds, by proof to try
Who is our equal: then thou shalt behold
Whether by supplication we intend
Address, and to begirt th’ Almighty Throne
Beseeching or besieging. (5.853-69)
His rhetoric, if not necessarily his logic, is perfectly in keeping with the spirit of
empiricism that flourished in seventeenth-century England. He sounds a bit like
Francis Bacon, who similarly complained in his Natural History (1622) that too
often “authority is taken for truth, not truth for authority.”45 Satan proposes “by
proof to try” doctrines held by the authorities—to try Authority itself, actually. To
do so he very deliberately engineers an experiment. But in my opening
qualification (‘if not necessarily his logic’) lies nearly everything.
At least since C. S. Lewis remarked that Satan, “being too proud to admit
derivation from God, has come to rejoice in believing that he ‘just grew’ like Topsy
or a turnip,” critics have questioned the logical consistency of Satan’s central
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“heresy” of self-generation.46 For Lewis, the logic “produces as proof of his selfexistence what is really its disproof,” an exercise in utter “nonsense.”47 But while
nearly everyone agrees on the crucial significance of this moment for Satan’s
character and revolt, critics “have been curiously silent on the actual content of
these lines,” as John Rogers notes.48 According to the animist materialism of
Paradise Lost, Rogers demonstrates, to claim that the angels have grown by their
“own quick’ning power” may not be so absurd at all. Milton’s monism, however,
is not necessarily Satan’s.49 Instead of weighing the relative merits of his argument
against the natural philosophy of Paradise Lost, we might also weigh those merits
against the empirical framework Satan explicitly invokes.
As so often in Milton’s text, the crux of the argument is entangled in
surprise. Satan’s rhetoric, not unlike his logic, is carefully designed to elicit a
specific response from his auditors (and Milton’s readers). I do not deny that
Satan’s claim is finally sophistical: in the blandest logical terms, it amounts to
something like “not P, therefore Q.” But there is a devilish method in that
sophistry, a cleverness lurking dangerously beneath the surface. He begins his
diatribe with perfectly plausible questions, at least from an empirical perspective.
If knowledge originates in experience, the angels might well wonder “whence
learnt” this “strange point and new.” Who among them has experience of this
creation, who remembers when the “Maker” gave them being, as God alleges to
have done? Obviously, the answer is none. Our interest is piqued, as is theirs. Then
comes the heresy. “We know no time when we were not as now;” he urges. Still on
firm empirical ground, the link between knowledge and experience remains intact.
Satan seems only to reformulate his earlier remark with this line, that none knows
any time before their own existence, such that they might know the “Maker” to
have made them. The semicolon at the end of this line helps to shape our
expectation for what follows, implying a strong relation to what precedes. “Know
none before us, self-begot, self-rais’d,” he continues in the following line. This
appears to be a sufficiently reasonable extension of his previous claims: not only
do we not know any time when we were made, we also know of no being(s) before
us who was self-created. That is, we have no experience of such an event, when a
prior being was “self-begot, self-rais’d.”
But this is not in fact what Satan argues, of course. It is what Satan should
have argued, what we might expect him to argue as a “good” empiricist. Such a
claim would have extended the doubt already cast on the act of creation to the
status of the alleged creator. “Do we really believe that God is causa sui?” Satan
might have insinuated. Instead, his logic runs something like this: we know none
before us [hard-pause], hence we are self-begot by our own quickening power. In
that pause, Satan implies a logical relation that is, to all appearances, specious.
“What he means,” Fish writes in his 1997 preface, “is that his first creation (out
of primordial matter or out of nothing) was self engineered by his ‘own quick’ning
power’ (V.861), a conclusion he draws (absurdly) from the fact that he doesn’t
remember being created by anybody else.”50 That the notion of self-generation
follows as a conclusion from his lack of memory is only implied, however; it’s an
impression of juxtaposition. And because of the enjambment at line 860, we have
an equally strong, if only temporary, impression that Satan claims to have no

Early Modern Culture 14

13

Surprised by Science
experience—and therefore no knowledge—of any being before him for which
“self-existent” is an appropriate predicate. Both impressions linger. If one is clearly
“absurd,” the other is not entirely without reason.
It is the potential relation between those two impressions that most
reveals the cleverness of Satan’s argument, and may help to explain what would
otherwise be an inexplicable effect. If Satan’s reasoning is so obviously absurd,
how does it succeed in convincing all but Abdiel? Are we to believe that all the
fallen angels are less sophisticated logicians than Milton’s readers? Satan’s
argument actually breaks down into two stages. In the first half, from lines 853 to
860, he aims primarily to question the preeminence of God and Christ. His
method here is patently empirical. It works by persistently denying any experiential
knowledge for God’s claims to have created the whole host of heaven. The second
half, from lines 860 to 866, works at the self-promotion of Satan and the other
angels (‘our puissance is our own’). These two strategies temporarily merge at the
enjambment (lines 860-61), where for an instant both meanings will hang in
contradictory suspension (i.e., that they know none self-created; and that they are
themselves self-created). If Satan succeeds in convincing his fellow angels of his
latter assertion that their puissance is their own, this conclusion will of course
entail the former denials of God’s preeminence and power. The angels cannot be
self-begot and created by God. But if Satan fails to convince others of his latter
claim for self-derived power, it does not thereby entail the negation of the former,
too. It is of course conceivable that the angels are not “self-rais’d” and yet still not
created by God. Despite any possible charges of absurdity from listeners and
readers, Satan is still justified, empirically if not morally speaking, to propose his
experiment, his attempt “by proof to try” God’s power.
The issue with Satan’s empiricism is not logical absurdity. Here is the real
problem that Satan faces with the specific experiment he has concocted. The war
in heaven might indeed offer proof that God is not the “Almighty Maker,” in the
event the rebels win. It cannot, even in such an event, prove that the angels are
“self-raised,” though. There are still other possibilities this particular experiment
cannot eliminate—that an as yet unknown being created everything and everyone,
including God, for instance. But what if, on the other hand, the rebel angels lose?
What does this prove? That God is the Almighty Maker? For a moment, Beelzebub
at least thinks so. After the fall to hell, he says of their conqueror that “I now / Of
force believe [him] almighty, since no less / Than such could have o’erpowered
such force as ours” (1.143-45; emphasis mine). Beelzebub has fully, if somewhat
mistakenly, internalized the logic of Satan’s bid for war in heaven, resting his
conclusion that God is Almighty Maker (the question from the first half of Satan’s
argument) on the self-promotion of Satan and his comrades (the second half of
the argument). Only omnipotence could have defeated such a force as ours, he
reasons. Unlike Beelzebub, however, Satan does not draw the same conclusion,
resolving to wage eternal war as a continued test of God’s power. He thus “perverts”
empiricism, Fried suggests, by “constantly refusing to acknowledge the resulting
proofs that there are no such limits [to God’s power].”51 But it is Beelzebub, not
Satan, who temporarily perverts the tenets of empiricism by ascribing more to the
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experiment than reason would allow. The loss in heaven proves only that the
angels have not succeeded in deposing God, not that God is impervious to assault.
Milton’s text thus exploits a problem implicit to the nature of
experimental investigation, which can validate only (1) that things have happened,
or (2) that they have not yet happened. Satan, it is true, fails to demonstrate in his
siege on heaven that God is not Almighty as he had hoped to do, but he certainly
does not thereby demonstrate that God is Almighty. That latter claim is impossible
to validate empirically. No amount of experimentation, and no expanse of time,
will ever demonstrate the proposition that “God cannot be defeated,” that his
sovereignty is without limit. This explains why Satan, the arch-tempter, continues
to try in Paradise Regained to thwart God, despite his countless failures. Each
individual attempt, each reiteration of that archetypal experiment in heaven, can
reveal at most that he still has not yet succeeded. For Satan to function in the text
as a perversion of empiricism as Fried and others have claimed, he more likely would
need to accept, as Beelzebub momentarily does, that God is the Almighty creator
purely on the basis of his experiment, rather than by faith. What Paradise Lost really
stages in the association between Satan and empiricism is the radical limitations of
the latter. If Satan’s continued experiments are at some point laughable, it is only
because he had hoped to prove, or to disprove, God’s preeminence in the first
place. Not because he failed to accept the proof.
Satan, like Adam later, reaches too high. He endeavors to know with
proof something that cannot be known by the standards of empirical reasoning.
In effect, Paradise Lost pushes empiricism to its logical and unsettling conclusion.
What Satan cannot experience by any number of experiments is the extent of God’s
power. If he could ever confirm this power has no limit, any subsequent
experiment would follow only from the willful ignorance Fried describes. But
experience, as David Hume would later write, “only teaches us, how one event
constantly follows another; without instructing us in the secret connexion, which
binds them together, and renders them inseparable.”52 Satan challenges God,
Satan fails. Even should he reiterate this pattern for all time, he could never know
by experience the “necessary connection” between these events. Consequently, he
cannot empirically predict the inevitability of his defeat, as Milton can by faith.
That he continues to “give[] not o’er though desperate of success” so many years
(and experiments) later in Paradise Regained is perhaps the best, if not also the most
tragic, indication of his unfaltering commitment to an overly strict empiricism. For
“there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance,
which is supposed to be exactly similar.”53 Each individual attempt reveals nothing
more than the last. God’s power remains elusive, beyond the limits of experimental
discovery. And so, Satan continues to experiment ad infinitum. He is, by his very
nature, the arch-tempter.
Satan’s empiricism and his experimental tendency to test the limits of
God’s power, his ambition for knowledge and his desire for independence, link
him firmly with Adam (and Eve) in Milton’s text. By extension, Paradise Lost links
him to us as well. His very nature as the “tempter” is to test or to assay, to try or
to experiment. Satan’s “original sin” is an experiment, an attempt to prove his
hypothesis that God is not all-powerful. Likewise, Adam’s “original error,” his first

Early Modern Culture 14

15

Surprised by Science
scientific mistake about the nature of celestial motions, is born of an ambition to
reach beyond his station, a presumption to know things not within human
comprehension. Just as Satan’s sin prefigures our own according to Milton’s text,
Adam’s error likewise prefigures the rampant miscalculations of seventeenth
century scientists—Gilbert, Kepler, and Galileo, among others. Given its rigidly
providential view of history, Paradise Lost takes as one of its principle aims an
exploration of the relations between past and future mistakes, both moral sins and
cognitive errors. Only in such a scheme can Raphael, speaking with Adam at the
outset of earth’s history, glimpse well into the future: “Already by thy reasoning,
this I guess…” In Milton’s text, the greatest “advances” in science to date serve
only to fulfill that original error.
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